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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
KENNETH S. DICK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43667
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-5888
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kenneth S. Dick appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction of sentence. He contends the district
court abused its discretion when it denied this motion because, at sentencing, the court
placed great weight on the fact that Mr. Dick had been arrested prior to sentencing, but
was not fully aware of, and thus did not adequately consider, the circumstances of his
arrest.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Dick and his fiancée were involved in an altercation early in the morning on
April 26, 2014. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.3-5.) Mr. Dick’s fiancée
called the police, and the police responded to their residence. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Dick
was not present at the time, but was arrested after his vehicle was stopped nearby, and
his breath alcohol content was measured at .153 and .143. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Dick was
charged by Information with attempted strangulation, domestic violence, unlawful
possession of a firearm, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol (DUI). (R., pp.60-62.)
Mr. Dick entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed
to plead guilty to domestic violence and the State agreed to dismiss the other charges
and recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, with the district
court retaining jurisdiction. (R., p.66.) The district court accepted Mr. Dick’s guilty plea.
(R., p.66.) Prior to sentencing, on October 26, 2014, Mr. Dick was arrested by the
Parma Police Department for DUI, domestic violence, and violation of a “no contact”
order. (PSI, pp.11, 112-13; Tr., p.6, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Dick allegedly drove over 30 miles
to the house where his prior fiancée was staying, struck her, and then drove under the
influence after leaving the residence. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-10.) As a result of Mr. Dick’s
arrest, the State determined it was released from its agreement to recommend a
particular sentence. (Tr., p.7, Ls.4-7.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified term of ten years, with three
years fixed, and without a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-11.) Counsel
for Mr. Dick concurred with the State’s recommendation of ten years, with three years
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fixed, but recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction.

(Tr., p.22, L.22 –

p.23, L.1.) The district court sentenced Mr. Dick to a unified term of ten years, with four
years fixed, and did not retain jurisdiction. (R., p.66, 71; Tr., p.28, Ls.17-24.) The
district court imposed this sentence largely because of Mr. Dick’s arrest on October 26,
2014. The district court said:
I agree with [Mr. Dick’s counsel] that these are only accusations at this
point. However, a very thorough investigation was done by the police,
according to the reports that are contained here. And, certainly, the
defendant did violate the law; the extent of those violations are the same
type of behavior that got him in trouble in the case that’s before me.
(Tr., p.26, Ls.4-10.) The judgment was entered on November 3, 2014. (R. pp.70-73.)
On February 26, 2015, Mr. Dick filed a pro se Rule 35 motion requesting that the
district court retain jurisdiction so that he could participate in a CAPP rider. (R., pp.7584.) The State filed an opposition to Mr. Dick’s motion. (R., pp.104-05.) On March 24,
2015, the district court entered an order denying Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp.106-11.) Mr. Dick delivered his pro se notice of appeal to jail officials for mailing
on May 5, 2015, but it was not actually filed until October 27, 2015. (R., pp.112-28.)
This Court entered an order on November 9, 2015, conditionally dismissing this appeal.
On January 13, 2016, this Court entered an order withdrawing the conditional dismissal.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 Motion
“A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court . . . and essentially is a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

“The denial of a motion for

modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused
its discretion.” Id.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion
because it did not exercise due caution when it considered, at sentencing, the facts of
Mr. Dick’s arrest on October 26, 2014.

A district court can consider allegations of

criminal conduct at sentencing, but it must exercise “due caution” in doing so. See
State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Paz, 112 Idaho 407, 409
(Ct. App. 1987).

The district court was not aware of all of the circumstances

surrounding Mr. Dick’s arrest on October 26, 2014, and did not exercise due caution
when it considered that arrest.
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Dick explained to the district court that, after
he committed the offense at issue, the victim contacted him multiple times through text
messages and phone calls. (R., p.78.) The victim also broke into Mr. Dick’s house on
multiple occasions and stole items belonging to Mr. Dick.

(R., p.79.)

Indeed, on

October 25, 2014, which was the day before Mr. Dick was arrested by the Parma Police
Department, the victim broke into Mr. Dick’s house and stole his laptop computer and
iPad. (R., p.79.) Mr. Dick accepted responsibility for the offense at issue, but argued to
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the district court that it had sentenced him based largely on the October 26, 2014 arrest,
without being fully aware of the circumstances surrounding that arrest.

Mr. Dick

explained:
I do not contest my guilt of the felony, nor do I want to minimize Emily
McKnight as a victim by disclosing the events and facts previously
mentioned. Emily McKnight deserves justice from my actions on the night
of April 25, 2014. I am attempting to share the events that occurred during
the 6 months preceding my sentencing on Oct. 30, 2014, so that I, too,
can receive a fair sentence and justice.
(R., p.80.)
In its order denying Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion, the district court acknowledged
that Mr. Dick had supported his motion with new information, but said that Mr. Dick’s
allegations about the victim “are irrelevant to the fact that [he] horribly beat the victim
before she allegedly did these bad acts, and immaterial to the sentence imposed.”
(R., p.110.) The district court’s explanation does not account for the fact it relied at
sentencing in large part on the fact of Mr. Dick’s October 26, 2014 arrest, which was
what resulted in the State’s recommendation that the district court not retain jurisdiction.
In fact, the district court appeared to consider Mr. Dick’s October 26, 2014 arrest as
almost a continuing pattern of conduct. This was improper and is not supported by the
circumstances leading up to the arrest.
Where, as here, a district court sentences a defendant for an offense that is not
before the court, and considers the existence of alleged criminal activity without due
caution, the proper remedy is for this Court to vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.

See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999)

(vacating and remanding for resentencing where “the district court went beyond [its]
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authority and essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the one that was
before the court”).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dick respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case to the district court with instructions to
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Dick pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601(4).
DATED this 20th day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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